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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
LARRY EUGENE PLUMB, 
Plaintiff/Respondent 
vs. 
PENELOPE JEANNE PLUMB, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
Case No. 14465 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
Where the custodial parent, after voluntarily relinquish-
ing the right to custody of the parties1 minor child, deceit-
fully removes the minor child from the forum state (Utah), 
does the forum state have continuing jurisdiction to adjudicate 
the child's custody. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
The District Court of Salt Lake County issued an Order 
against the appellant to show cause why custody of the parties1 
minor child, Scott Plumb, should not be changed from the 
appellant to the respondent. Appellant, domiciled in South 
Dakota, specially appeared to contest the District Court of 
Salt Lake County's jurisdiction. Judge Gordon R. Hall denied 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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appellant's Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction and 
on January 13, 1976, awarded custody of Scott Plumb to 
respondent. 
RELIEF REQUESTED ON APPEAL 
Respondent prays that the court affirm Judge Hall's 
January 13, 1976, order which awarded respondent custody 
of Scott Plumb, the parties1 minor child. 
FACTS 
The parties to this appeal were married on July 26, 
1971, in Wilmot, South Dakota (R.l). On April 9, 1974, the 
parties were granted a Decree of Divorce by the District 
Court of Salt Lake County, State of Utah (R.8). By the terms 
of the Decree, the appellant was awarded custody of the parties1 
minor child, Scott Plumb, subject to the respondent's visi-
tation rights (R.9). Sometime subsequent to the Decree, but 
prior to August, 1974, appellant voluntarily relinquished 
custodial rights of the minor child to the Utah State Division 
of Family Services, which department placed the child with 
respondent's parents (R.4; Sup. R.2). During the month of 
August, 1974, appellant surreptitiously and without permission 
or consent of the Division of Family Services and without 
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informing respondent's parents, removed the minor child 
from the State of Utah (R.24; Sup. R.2). On April 4, 1975, 
appellant's parents petitioned the Fifth Circuit Court in 
Robert County, South Dakota, requesting to be appointed the 
guardian of the parties' minor child alleging inter alia, 
that appellant had neglected, abandoned and had done nothing 
for the minor child (R.24, 25; Sup. R.2). On April 17, 1975, 
respondent filed an Order to Show Cause with the District 
Court of Salt Lake County, requesting that the Decree of 
Divorce be modified to award respondent the care, custody and 
control of the parties' minor child (R.24, 25, 26; Sup. R.2). 
Appellant, served by mail in South Dakota, pursuant to Rule 4(f) 
of the URCP, made a special appearance to contest the court's 
jurisdiction (R.34, 39, 41-45, 54, 55). On June 27, 1975, 
Judge Gordon R. Hall denied appellant's Motion to Dismiss for 
Lack of Jurisdiction and on January 13, 1976, entered an Order 
amending the Decree of Divorce of April 9, 1974, by awarding 
the care, custody and control of Scott Plumb to the respondent 
(R.62, 63). Scott Plumb presently is within the jurisdiction 
and residing with the respondent Larry Plumb in Salt Lake City, 
Utah. 
ARGUMENT 
THE UTAH COURT HAD CONTINUING JURISDICTION TO MODIFY AND 
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AMEND ITS ORIGINAL DECREE OF DIVORCE RESPECTING THE CUSTODY 
OF THE PARTIES' MINOR CHILD. 
Section 30-3-5, Utah Code Annotated (1953) states in 
pertinent part: 
"The court shall have continuing jurisdiction 
to make such subsequent changes or new orders 
with respect to the support and maintenance of 
the parties, the custody of the children, and 
their support and maintenance, or the distribu-
tion of property as shall be reasonable and 
necessary." 
Section 30-3-5 recognizes that the Utah Courts maintain contin 
uing jurisdiction to hear custody disputes subsequent to 
Divorce Decrees. This continuing jurisdiction is in addition 
to the broad equitable powers conferred upon the court to 
determine rights of the parties, and custody of children. 
POINT I 
THE UTAH COURT RETAINED JURISDICTION OVER THE PARTIES1 
MINOR CHILD BECAUSE IT WAS HIS STATE OF DOMICILE. 
Judge Hall in the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of 
Law filed with his January 13, 1976, Order stated: 
"That prior to August, 1974, defendant had volun-
tarily placed Scott Plumb in the care of the Utah 
State Division of Family Services. The Division 
of Family Services had then placed Scott Plumb in 
the home of plaintiff's parents, Mr. and Mrs. 
Larry Plumb. On or about August, 1974, defendant 
took Scott Plumb to South Dakota without permission 
or consent of the Division of Family Services and 
without informing Mr. and Mrs. Larry Plumb. 
(Sup. R.2)." 
-4-Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
In this finding, it is apparent that the lower court based 
jurisdiction, in part, on the determination that Utah was 
Scott's state of domicile. (Sup.R.2). The finding was based 
upon the respondent's affidavit as well as testimony given 
by the appellant and a representative of the Utah Division 
of Family Services at a hearing held on May 28, 1975 (R.24-25; 
32, 34). That testimony as capsulized in respondent's affi-
davit was that even though appellant had been awarded custody 
of Scott Plumb in the original Decree of Divorce, appellant 
voluntarily relinquished her custodial and parental rights and 
obligations to the Utah State Division of Family Services. 
That Division in turn placed Scott in the custody of respondent's 
parents. (R. 24-25). 
It is a well settled legal principal that when the cus-
todial parent gives custody of a minor child to another with 
the intention of relinquishing parental rights and obligations, 
the abandoned child's domicile is that of the other parent who 
has not abandoned him. See Restatement 2nd, Conflicts of Law, 
Section 22, Comment C; See also Lyons vs. Egan, 110 Colo. 227, 
132 P.2d 794 (1942). Since Scott already was domiciled in 
Utah at the time appellant relinquished her custodial rights, 
Scott retained domicile in the State of Utah and remained 
subject to the jurisdiction of the Utah Courts. 
-5-
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It should be noted that the question of what constitutes 
abandonment relates to the rules of domicile and that the 
forum court decides that issue based upon its own standards 
and rules. See Restatement 2nd, Conflicts of Law, Section 8 
and 13. It should also be noted that during the course of the 
proceedings below, appellant failed to rebut the allegations 
contained in respondent's affidavit, failed to introduce 
testimony in evidence subsequent to the May 28, 1975, hearing 
and failed to make timely objection to the District Court's 
finding relating to the abandonment of the parties' minor child* 
Therefore, the issue of whether Scott was actually abandoned 
is not before this court. 
Not only did Scott retain a domicile in the State of Utah, 
by virtue of the respondent's domicile, but when he was aban-
doned, he became a ward of the State and the State, exercising 
its sovereign power of guardianship, was authorized to exercise 
parental authority and consequently retain jurisdiction over 
the minor. See Johnson vs. Johnson, 105 Ariz. 233, 462 P.2d 
782 (1969) (43 CJS Infants Section 4); cf Hentz vs„ Hentz 
371 Mich. 335, 123 NW 2d 757 (1963). 
Further, appellant's surreptitious and deceitful taking 
of the parties' minor child out of the jurisdiction does not 
defeat the District Court's jurisdiction or vitiate appellant's 
-6-
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voluntarily relinquishment of custodial responsibilities 
to the Division of Family Services. As noted, the juris-
diction of the Utah Court has never been relinquished. Scott 
remained domiciled here in Utah during the time appellant 
lived here and she relinquished her custodial rights over 
Scott prior to departing from the jurisdiction. Thus, where 
the jurisdiction of the Utah Court had attached in the orig-
inal divorce proceedings, it cannot be affected by the resi-
dential change of a non-custodial parent, 24 Am Jur 2d, Divorce 
and Separation Section 8,13 and 8,24. In Lassiter vs. Wilson, 
207 Ala. 699, 93 So. 598 (1922), the Alabama Court held that 
once jurisdiction had attached, the subsequent removal of an 
infant beyond the territorial jurisdiction of the court does 
not affect jurisdiction. See also Greef vs. Greef, 6 Wis. 2d 
269, 94 NW 2d 625 (1959). 
It is generally well accepted that under the "clean hands" 
doctrine, a court from a sister state will refuse to exercise 
jurisdiction over a child deceptively brought into the state 
to defeat the jurisdiction of a domiciliary court. In Leathers 
vs. Leathers, 328 P.2d 853 (1958), a mother deceptively brought 
the children into California from Illinois, the children's 
state of domicile, and immediately petitioned the California 
court to grant her custody of the minor children. On appeal, 
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the California court refused to entertain jurisdiction because 
the mother seeking relief in the California court had come 
to the court with "unclean hands", Id. at 858- See Also 
Bowman vs. Bowman, 125 Cal. at 602, 13 P.2d 1049, 14 P.2d 558 
(1932), In Re: Cameron's Guardianship, 66 Cal. App. 2d 884, 
153 P.2d 385 (1944); In Re; Kyle, 77 Cal. App. 2d 634, 176 
P.2d 96 (1947); Application of Dehning, 135 Cal. Ap. 2d 635 
287 P.2d 782 (1955); 13 ALR 2d at 318 and 319. 
Based upon the court's finding that Scott was domiciled 
in Utah and subject to the supervision of the Division of 
Family Services, he therefore was subject to Utah jurisdiction 
and Judge Hall's Order of January 13, 1976, should be affirmed 
by this court. See Sampsell vs. Superior Court, 32 Cal. 2d 
763, 777, 197 P.2d 739, 748 (1948). 
POINT II 
BY STATUTE, THE LOWER COURT, HAVING JURISDICTION OVER THE 
PARTIES TO THE ORIGINAL DIVORCE DECREE HAD CONTINUING JURIS-
DICTION TO MODIFY AND AMEND THE CUSTODY PROVISIONS. 
As previously noted, Section 30-3-5 grants the lower court 
"continuing jurisdiction to make subsequent changes or new 
orders with respect to • . . the custody of children • • . .,f 
Appellant argues at length the minority view that the Utah court 
may exercise "continuing jurisdiction" only when the child is domi 
ciled within the Statefs territory of jurisdiction. Since the 
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lower court found Scott to be domiciled with the State, 
appellant argues a position upon which this court could 
affirm the lower court's order. 
Assuming arguendo, that the court had found that Scott 
was not domiciled in Utah, the great weight of authority 
holds that Utah still had jurisdiction to modify or amend 
its own Decree. This authority is based upon the proposition 
that where a court had original jurisdiction over the parties 
involved in a divorce action, the court retains continuing 
jurisdiction to modify or amend the custody provisions of 
its original decree. See Hentz vs. Hentz, Supra.; Davis vs. 
Davis, 1 Cal. Rptr. 923 (1960); Lyerla vs. Lyerla, 403 P.2d 99 
(Kans. 1965); Conrad vs. Conrad, Mo. App. 296 SW 196 (1927); 
Hersey vs. Hersey, 27 Mass. 545, 171 NE 815, 70 Atl. 518 (1930), 
Tinker vs. Tinker, 134 Okl. 97, 290 P. 185 (1930); Van Gundy vs. 
Van Gundy, 244 Iowa 488, 56 NW 2d 43 (1952), Levell vs. Levell, 
183 Or. 39, 190 P.2d 527 (1948); Sherwood vs. Sherwood, 48 Wash. 
2d 128, 291 P.2d 674 (1955); Graves vs. Wooden, Mo. App. 291 
SW 2d 665 (1956), 27B CJS Divorce, Section 317 (1)(c), pages 
533-534, (1959) and 9 ALR 2d 457 to 458. 
Typical of the cases supporting the majority view is the 
1960 California Case of Davis vs. Davis, Supra. In that case 
a California court had granted the parties a divorce with the 
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mother being given custody of the parties1 minor children. 
After the Decree, the mother remarried and with the children 
moved to the State of Oklahoma. The father, being denied 
visitation rights, sought and obtained from the California 
court an Order to Show Cause against the mother. After hear-
ing, the California court modified its Decree and awarded 
custody to the father. The wife appealed, arguing that be-
cause the children were domiciled in Oklahoma, the California 
court had no jurisdiction to change custody. Affirming the 
modified order, the California Supreme Court opined that by 
statute: 
". . . jurisdiction is exclusively reserved 
to the divorce court in California to modify 
its custody awards and our courts have agreed 
that the fact that the children later become 
domiciled in another jurisdiction does not 
deprive the court of jurisdiction to modify 
its custody awards previously made." Id. 
at 924. 
This reasoning is applicable to the case at bar. The Utah 
court had original jurisdiction over the parties to the 
divorce action and dissolved their marital obligations. By 
statute (§30-3-5) the Utah court retained jurisdiction to 
modify the custody provisions of the Decree even though the 
minor child had been removed from the jurisdiction. 
It is significant that the California court in Davis, 
Supra, rejected the reasoning of the Montana court in the case 
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of Application of Enke, 129 Mont. 353, 287 P.2d 19, Cert. 
denied sub nom. 350 US 923, 76 S. Ct. 212, 100 L.ed. 808 
(1944), which is relied upon by appellant, because it repre-
sented a minority view. The court further recognized that 
the Enke case was not in harmony with Sampsell vs. Superior 
Court, Supra, (also relied upon by appellant) because Sampsell 
held that "courts of two or more states may have concurrent 
jurisdiction over the custody of a child". (Citations omitted) 
Id. at 925. 
Similarly, in Hentz vs. Hentz, Supra., a mother who was 
domiciled in Texas returned to Michigan, the court granting 
the original divorce, and petitioned the court for a change 
of custody. The facts indicate that after the parties were 
divorced in Michigan, the father and children moved to Illinois 
and established domicile there. Affirming the modification 
of the Decree, the Michigan court indicated that by statute: 
" . . . there is a continuing authority and 
jurisdiction in the court granting a Decree 
of Divorce to alter its provisions as to child 
custody. . . . that continuing jurisdiction 
cannot be determined by action of one of the 
parties in taking the children, either with 
or without statutory or court permission, out 
of the state and causing them to be domiciled 
elsewhere." Id. at 762. 
As further justification of this position, the court continued: 
"In this, as in all cases involving minors 
custodial control, 2 principles of law are 
involved. One is the natural right of a 
parent or parents to the custody of their 
-11-
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child or children. . . . but this right is 
not absolute. For children too have rights 
and when they are violated by the parents in 
the exercise of their custodial control, then 
the children become subject to the judicial 
control as wards of the court." Id at 762. 
This reasoning is particularly appropriate in the present 
appeal because not only did the appellant violate her cus-
todial control, by relinquishing her right of custody to the 
state agency, she also sought to insulate her activities by 
removing the child from the jurisdiction. Thus under its 
broad equitable powers and its original jurisdiction, the 
Utah court had the right to modify the custodial rights of 
the parties and to protect the rights of the children involved. 
In Lyerla vs. Lyerla, 403 P.2d 989 (1965), Kansas had a 
statute which gave the court jurisdiction to modify custody 
if "the court has previously exercised jurisdiction to deter-
mine the custody of a child who was at the time domiciled in 
the state". Factually, Kansas had granted the parties a divorce 
and placed the parties" minor children in the mother's custody. 
On permission of the court, the mother removed the children to 
Nevada. Due to visitation disputes, the father petitioned the 
Kansas court for change of custody. While the court recognized 
it had actual jurisdiction over one of the parties' minor 
children, it also stated that because the District Court had 
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previously exercised jurisdiction over the child's custody 
when the divorce was granted, the trial court by statute 
could exercise continuing jurisdiction. It further noted 
that this right of continuing jurisdiction would alone 
justify the court's actions. Id., at 993. 
It should also be noted that the Kansas court indicated 
that the statutory change which provided for continuing jur-
isdiction where the court had previously exercised jurisdic-
tion supplanted and therefore overruled the decision relied 
upon by the appellant in Leach vs. Leach, 184 Kansas 335, 
P.2d 435 (1959). 
CONCLUSION 
On appeal, appellant is requesting this court to reverse 
an order in which the District Court, exercising continuing 
jurisdiction, modified the custody provisions of its original 
divorce decree. In essence, the appellant is asking this court 
to ignore the provisions of §30-3-5, UCA which specifically 
grants to District Courts that power. 
Appellant argues that the District Court had no authority 
to modify the decree because the partiesf minor child was 
not physically within the state, a situation brought about by 
the appellantfs ignoble act. However, the District Court 
rightly found that even though Scott Plumb had been removed 
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from the jurisdiction, Utah remained his State of domicile, 
On this basis the District Court acted properly in exer-
cising jurisdiction to modify the original divorce decree. 
Respondent respectfully requests that this court affirm 
Judge Gordon R. Hall's January 13, 1976, Order. 
DATED this fJL^day of May, 1976. 
Respectfully submitted, 
torneys for Plaintiff/Respondent 
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